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Peace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 275 pp.
Reviewed by Jeffrey W. Knopf, Naval Postgraduate School
During the Cold War, strategic theory focused on two situations in which states
would rely on deterrence: direct deterrence, in which a country seeks to prevent an at-
tack on its homeland; and extended deterrence, in which a country seeks to prevent an
adversary from attacking a third party. In this highly original and valuable study, Tim-
othy Crawford points out that states might also have an interest in relying on deter-
rence in a third situation: when they seek to deter two adversaries from attacking each
other. Crawford describes the deterrer in this scenario as a “pivot” between the other
parties, leading to the label “pivotal deterrence.”
Crawford points out that this concept is contrary to conventional wisdom.
Mainstream strategic thought holds that states must clearly take a side in a dispute if
they want to be effective in inºuencing its outcome. Hence, part of the contribution
made by Pivotal Deterrence is in showing that in some situations a state is likely to
have a clear interest in this type of deterrence and that efforts at pivotal deterrence can
in fact succeed. The United States, for example, has sought to deter conºicts between
Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan. Having a label to at-
tach to such efforts will make it easier for policymakers to think of it as an option in
their toolkit. It also creates a category of similar cases, which analysts can then com-
pare to develop a general understanding of pivotal deterrence.
Crawford explains the logic of pivotal deterrence clearly and persuasively. For
pivotal deterrence to be feasible, the pivot state must have enough power to affect the
outcome of a military conºict between the two other parties, and those two parties
must fear each other more than they fear the pivot so that each would be willing to co-
operate with the pivot. The pivot can then exert leverage by threatening to alter its
alignment. The pivot’s reliance on threats is what makes this strategy a form of deter-
rence and distinguishes it from other conºict-prevention tools, such as mediation. In
practice, two different threats might be employed. If one of the states in a potential
conºict (State A) wants the pivot’s active support before starting a war, the pivot’s
threat to stay neutral can dissuade State A from using force. But if State A is willing to
go to war in the expectation that the pivot will remain neutral, deterrence requires the
pivot to threaten to back State B. The tricky aspect of pivotal deterrence is that the
Journal of Cold War Studies
Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 126–179
© 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
pivot must give one or the other of these deterrent threats to both parties while ensur-
ing that the signal to one party does not undermine the message being given to the
other.
Crawford argues that making both messages credible requires ambiguity. Pivotal
deterrence works if the pivot creates sufªcient uncertainty in the minds of both State
A and State B about what the pivot will actually do if one of them starts a war. This
again challenges conventional wisdom, which suggests that clarity of commitments is
a key to deterrence success. Pivotal Deterrence emphasizes instead that sometimes stra-
tegic ambiguity is preferable to a clear, ªrm commitment. Determining the conditions
under which clarity or ambiguity is better will require further research, but Crawford
is right to see this as still an open question.
The book contains four detailed case studies—two that are deemed successes and
two that are deemed failures. Crawford convincingly demonstrates that pivotal deter-
rence worked in the two successes: Bismarck’s efforts to prevent war between Austria
and Russia in the 1870s, and U.S. efforts to prevent war between Greece and Turkey
as a result of crises over Cyprus in the 1960s. The most interesting case study, how-
ever, is one of the failures: Britain’s efforts to keep France and Germany from going to
war in 1914. Sir Edward Grey has been widely criticized for not making a ªrmer de-
terrent commitment to aid France. Crawford, however, interprets Grey’s ambiguity as
an effort at pivotal deterrence, and he shows that Grey’s actions did have some re-
straining inºuence on France and Germany in the ªnal days of the July crisis, albeit
not enough to overcome the other forces working to produce World War I.
Because pivotal deterrence can either succeed or fail, Crawford seeks to specify
the conditions that favor one or the other outcome. He contends that alignment op-
tions are the key. When one or both of the parties in conºict can identify plausible,
useful allies other than the pivot, pivotal deterrence is likely to fail. To have deterrent
leverage, the pivot must be the only game in town. The importance of the pivot and
other potential allies, Crawford notes, raises doubts about many dyadic theories of
war, which do not take into account how the anticipated reactions of third parties
inºuence decisions about whether to go to war. The case studies reveal that pivotal de-
terrence can also be counterproductive at times because it encourages a “blame game”
in which each side tries to maneuver the other side into escalating. State A does so in
the hope that the pivot will blame State B for the war and will refrain from supporting
State B.
In the ªnal two chapters, Crawford discusses how unipolarity creates many situa-
tions in which the United States, as the dominant power in the world, may wish to at-
tempt pivotal deterrence. Yet here he turns strangely reticent, emphasizing that “pre-
ponderance is no panacea” (p. 214) and that pivotal deterrence might still fail. Because
Crawford’s theory is so structural—pivotal deterrence succeeds or fails based entirely
on the distribution of power and availability of potential allies—the book ultimately
has much less policy relevance than it could have. Manipulating the alignment op-
tions available to other states is difªcult in the short run. In urgent situations requir-
ing deterrence—as a crisis threatens to escalate to war—the theory provides no advice
to policymakers about how to practice pivotal deterrence if the underlying conditions
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are not already favorable. Follow-up research on steps that leaders could take in the
short run to bolster pivotal deterrence would thus be especially useful. However, this
does not detract from the signiªcant contributions Crawford makes in this study. Piv-
otal Deterrence is a must read for anyone seriously interested in questions of strategy
and statecraft.
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Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Disarmament
Movement 1971 to the Present. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. 657 pp.
$32.95.
Reviewed by Patrick Glynn
Those of us who lived through the ªerce anti-nuclear debates of the 1980s—whether
as proponents or opponents of the anti-nuclear position—cannot but have vivid
memories of that turbulent era. Doubtless some remember those years as a period
tinged with fear. I certainly recall the evening in November 1983 when the ABC net-
work treated us all to a made-for-television movie, The Day After, depicting the town
of Lawrence, Kansas, being obliterated in a nuclear war. The ªlm left even Ronald
Reagan feeling depressed, as he recalled in his memoir. Yet by and large the debate
over nuclear weapons in the 1980s was marked by a high-mindedness and seriousness
of moral purpose—I would argue on both sides—that is rare in democratic dialogue.
(The debate certainly compares favorably with the kinds of issues that dominated
public debate during the ªnal years of the Clinton presidency.) Although it may seem
strange to say so, the challenge of nuclear weapons—the dilemmas of disarmament
and deterrence—in many ways brought the best out of American democracy in that
era.
The value of Lawrence S. Wittner’s Toward Nuclear Abolition—the third and
ªnal volume in his history of the nuclear disarmament movement—is to capture and
preserve some of the spirit of that time. Reading Wittner’s account, one is almost as-
tonished at the true scope of the 1980s anti-nuclear movement, which spanned the
globe. Western Europe, Asia, North America, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union it-
self—almost no country, it seems, was untouched by the welling up of popular protest
against the specter of nuclear annihilation. Wittner writes as a partisan of the move-
ment, and probably no one but a partisan would have had the patience to chronicle
such a sprawling international phenomenon in such detail. Wittner draws on mem-
oirs, archival records, and, perhaps most valuably, personal interviews with activists
and government ofªcials of the era.
In most accounts, the anti-nuclear movement forms a mere backdrop to super-
power diplomacy. Here Wittner brings the tragic chorus to center stage. However, the
risk of such an approach is that it introduces a measure of distortion into the historical
drama. In Wittner’s account, the anti-nuclear movement becomes the main historical
actor in the period—not to say its hero. For Wittner, it was not Reagan or the United
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